Since renewables first became the law in Minnesota from 2001, residential electricity prices went up by 111%, use went down by -8%, and bills went up by 95% (to 2025). MN renewables law was further enhanced in 2007, 2021 and 2023. Monopolies have been MN law since 1974.
MN electricity unaffordability is driven by state statutes and through the state’s Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The most relevant legislation and regulation can be found under 2026 Minnesota Statutes (Utilities) Chapters, 216 – 217. Key quotes and my comments follow.
Monopolies
216B.37 ASSIGNED SERVICE AREA; ELECTRIC UTILITY; LEGISLATIVE POLICY.
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest that, in order to encourage the development of coordinated statewide electric service at retail, to eliminate or avoid unnecessary duplication of electric utility facilities, and to promote economical, efficient, and adequate electric service to the public, the state of Minnesota shall be divided into geographic service areas within which a specified electric utility shall provide electric service to customers on an exclusive basis.
“Unnecessary duplication” is one of the key arguments in favor of regulation of natural monopolies. This was first debunked in a seminal academic paper in 1968 by Professor Harold Demsetz of the University of Chicago in “Why Regulate Utilities?” as follows:
Communities and not individuals own or control most of the ground and air rights-of-way used by public utility distribution systems. The problem of excessive duplication of distribution systems is attributable to the failure of communities to set a proper price on the use of these scarce resources. … The setting of an appropriate fee for the use of these resources would reduce the degree of duplication to optimal levels.
216B.01 LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS.
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest that public utilities be regulated as hereinafter provided in order to provide the retail consumers of natural gas and electric service in this state with adequate and reliable services at reasonable rates, consistent with the financial and economic requirements of public utilities and their need to construct facilities to provide such services or to otherwise obtain energy supplies, to avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities which increase the cost of service to the consumer and to minimize disputes between public utilities which may result in inconvenience or diminish efficiency in service to the consumers.
Another seminal academic paper from the University of Chicago in 1968, this time by Judge Richard Posner in “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,” challenged that it is “in the public interest that public utilities be regulated” as follows:
In principle, the repeal of public utility…legislation emerges as an attractive goal of public policy. … [I]t seems reasonable to ask the supporters of a government program to bear the burden of showing that it is likely to produce a net social gain. The resources and energies of government should be directed to problems that we know are substantial, that we think are tractable to government action, and that cannot be left to the private sector to work out. There are plenty of those problems, and it is doubtful that natural monopoly is among them.
Renewables
216B.243 CERTIFICATE OF NEED FOR LARGE ENERGY FACILITY.
Subd. 3a. Use of renewable resource.
The commission may not issue a certificate of need under this section for a large energy facility that generates electric power by means of a nonrenewable energy source, unless the applicant for the certificate has demonstrated to the commission’s satisfaction that it has explored the possibility of generating power by means of renewable energy sources and has demonstrated that the alternative selected is less expensive, including environmental costs, than power generated by a renewable energy source. For purposes of this subdivision, “renewable energy source” includes hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal energy and the use of trees or other vegetation as fuel.
RAND economists Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson first posited the “Averch-Johnson Effect,” or overcapitalization bias, in a 1962 academic paper for the American Economic Review entitled “Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint” as follows:
One implication drawn from the model is that the firm increases its ratio of capital input [i.e. the “regulatory bias” in favor of investment in plant and equipment] to cooperating factor input in a manner that in-creases social costs at the equilibrium output. … At the same time, regulatory practices that provide an incentive for the firm to operate in some markets even at a loss may constitute a convenient mechanism through which certain activities of the firm judged to be in the “public interest” can be subsidized. … Furthermore, it might be interesting to explore alternative forms of government control that, by avoiding the return-on-investment criterion for price regulation, do not generate the bias disclosed here.
216B.2422 RESOURCE PLANNING; RENEWABLE ENERGY.
Subd. 4. Preference for renewable energy facility.
The commission shall not approve a new or refurbished nonrenewable energy facility in an integrated resource plan or a certificate of need, pursuant to section 216B.243, nor shall the commission allow rate recovery pursuant to section 216B.16 for such a nonrenewable energy facility, unless the utility has demonstrated that a renewable energy facility is not in the public interest. When making the public interest determination, the commission must consider: (1) whether the resource plan helps the utility achieve the greenhouse gas reduction goals under section 216H.02, the renewable energy standard under section 216B.1691, …
The legal term “in the public interest” has too often, been pliable in meaning, and resulted in proverbially: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.” As the Nobel Prize winning economist, Professor James Buchanan, explained in his 1962 book “The Calculus of Consent:”
[An] individual acts on the basis of the same over-all value scale when he participates in market activity and in political activity [i.e.] seeks…to maximize his own utility, [not] to find the “public interest” or “common good.” Moreover, a significant factor in the popular support for socialism through the centuries has been the underlying faith that the shift of an activity from the realm of private to that of social choice involves the replacement of the motive of private gain by that of social good. … It would be interesting to examine the full implications of the behavioral assumption which holds that the individual always seeks the “public interest,” but…no one has yet provided us with an analysis of the organization of a society of angels.
Affordability
216B.2422 RESOURCE PLANNING; RENEWABLE ENERGY.
Subd. 4. Preference for renewable energy facility.
When making the public interest determination, the commission must consider: … (2) impacts on local and regional grid reliability; (3) utility and ratepayer impacts resulting from the intermittent nature of renewable energy facilities, including but not limited to the costs of purchasing wholesale electricity in the market and the costs of providing ancillary services; and (4) utility and ratepayer impacts resulting from reduced exposure to fuel price volatility, changes in transmission costs, portfolio diversification, and environmental compliance costs.
The University of Chicago once again has produced a landmark academic paper of relevance to the situation at hand. This time from the Energy Policy Institute (EPIC) in 2024, answering the question, “Do Renewable Portfolio Standards Deliver?” as follows:
This paper has provided the first comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of RPS [Renewable Portfolio Standards] programs, which are the most popular and prevalent carbon policy in the United States [including Minnesota]. … RPS program passage leads to substantial increases in electricity prices. Seven years after passage, we estimate that average retail prices are 1.4 cents per kWh, or 11%, higher than they otherwise would be, with over half the increase due to increased transmission and distribution costs. The corresponding effect twelve years after passage is 2.3 cents per kWh, or 17%, higher. … A particularly striking finding is that RPS programs meaningfully alter electricity market equilibria. … This finding raises the possibility that indirect costs associated with grid integration [including intermittency, transmission, and stranded asset payments] could represent the more important barrier to substantially increasing renewables’ share of generation than the direct cost of renewable energy.
216B.03 REASONABLE RATE.
Every rate made, demanded, or received by any public utility, or by any two or more public utilities jointly, shall be just and reasonable. Rates shall not be unreasonably preferential, unreasonably prejudicial, or discriminatory, but shall be sufficient, equitable, and consistent in application to a class of consumers. To the maximum reasonable extent, the commission shall set rates to encourage energy conservation and renewable energy use and to further the goals of sections 216B.164, 216B.241, and 216C.05. Any doubt as to reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer.
Rates are meant to be: 1.) “just and reasonable;” 2.) “to the maximum reasonable extent,…encourage…renewable energy use;” and 3.) “any doubt as to reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer.” As presented below, #2 was achieved, but not #1 or #3:
- Minnesota’s electricity generation ratio of both renewables and natural gas grew from 3% each in 2004 to 31% and 27% respectively by 2024, whilst coal and nuclear both shrunk from 65% and 25% respectively in 2004 to 20% each by 2024.
- Minnesota’s average electricity use, for all three major classes of customers combined (i.e. residential, commercial ad industrial), grew 26% from 21,417 kWh per customer in 1984 to a peak of 26,876 kWh in 2008 then shrunk -17% to 22,375 kWh by 2025.
- Minnesota’s average electricity rates rose 117% from 5.97 (cents per kWh) in 2001 to 13.03 in 2026, for all three major classes of customers combined, resulting in average electricity rates rank dropped 16 spots from #14 in 2001 to #30 in 2026.
Conclusion
“It’s The Law” is a meme that originated 20 years ago from a little-known TV comedy, “typically to show that something is an unspoken rule, often without needing any justification or reason.”
Electricity unaffordability is not “an unspoken rule,” “it’s the law!” And “without…any justification or reason.” This is authoritatively demonstrated by reference to state statutes, academic studies and federal statistics, not to mention a Nobel Prize winning economist.
Cover Image Source: Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes

